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RECENT DECISIONS
CIVIL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION - NONRESIDENT MOTORIST STATUTE MAY
BE APPLIED TO REACH AUTO OWNER WHO NEVER ENTERED STATE. - Ida Weitz,
a resident of Texas, in purchasing a car to be used by her minor son while stationed
at Camp Lejeune, N.C., obtained a liability insurance policy from the defendant,
covering the named insured and anyone driving with her permission. A friend of
the son, while driving the car with the latter's consent, negligently killed plaintiff's
intestate. Plaintiff was awarded a default judgment in a North Carolina court
against Weitz, after substituted service of process on her in Texas in accordance
with the North Carolina nonresident motorist statute." Plaintiff, unable to collect
this judgment, sued the defendant on the insurance policy in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina and recovered judgment
to the amount of the policy, plus interest. Defendant, on appeal to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, attacked jurisdiction of North Carolina courts over Weitz.
Held: that state court jurisdiction did not offend due process and that the substan-
tive findings of liability by the state courts were final and controlling, not having
been appealed. Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 294 F.2d 641 (4th Cir.
1961).
The court found that the North Carolina statute, as interpreted in the state
courts, authorized such service of process. The statute spoke of actions "growing out
of any accident or collision in which said nonresident . .. [was] involved by reason
of the operation by him, for him, and under his control or direction, express or im-
plied, of a motor vehicle."' 2 The case law held that there was sufficient "control or
direction"3 if defendant had "the legal right to exercise control"4 when the death
occurred. The Davis court concluded that "in turning the automobile over to her
son Mrs. Weitz expressly authorized him to permit others to drive it."
The court held that service in this case did not violate any constitutional rights
of the defendant under the 14th amendment, that in personam jurisdiction is lim-
ited constitutionally only by the "standards of fairness embodied in the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," 6 which require only the giving of adequate
notice to the defendant,7 and a "reasonable" exercise of jurisdiction." This means,
said the court, that the defendant must have "minimum contacts" with the state
asserting jurisdiction such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice."9 On this point, the court's dis-
cussion culminated in the holding:
ET]hat ownership of property, particularly that which is capable of inflict-
ing serious injury, may fairly be coupled with an obligation upon the owner
to stand suit where the property is or has been taken"o with his consent. 11
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-105 (Supp. 1959). For a discussion of other circumstances in
which no personal service of process is required, see Ehrenzweig, The Transient Role of Per-
sonal Jurisdiction: The "Power Myth and Forum Conveniens," 65 YALE L.J. 289, 309-311
(1956).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-105 (Supp. 1959).
3 Ewing v. Thompson, 233 N.C. 564, 65 S.E.2d 17 (1951).
4 Pressley v. Turner, 249 N.C. 102, 105 S.E.2d 289 (1958).
5 Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641, 645 (4th Cir. 1961). Before she
gave him the car, "Mrs. Weitz admonished her son to be careful how he drove and whom he
let drive." Id. at 643.
6 Id. at 646.
7 Citing Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
8 Supra note 5, at 646. The court cites: International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316-320 (1945); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAws § 74 (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1956).
9 Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641, 646 (4th Cir. 1961). Citing
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
10 See generally Ehrenzweig, supra note 1, at 306; 40 Mich. L. Rev. 781 (1942).
11 See Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253- (1933), holding that the imposition of liability on
a nonresident automobile owner for injuries caused by the negligent driving of a permittee not
his agent or servant, when the laws of the owner's state did not impose such liability, was not
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... [IWf the state chooses by appropriate law to assert its jurisdiction over
him in respect to liability arising out of the use of his property in that state.
12
Forty-nine states now have nonresident motorist statutes providing for some
form of substituted service.13 An early New Jersey statute required an actual appoint-
ment of the Secretary of State as attorney for the nonresident motorist to receive
service for him "in any action or legal proceeding caused by the operation of his
registered motor vehicle within this state against such owner.' u 4 The decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Hess v. Pawloski,'5 upholding a similar non-
resident motorist statute,16 can be said to have provided the constitutional basis for
the subsequent enactment of similar legislation, in which no actual appointment
was required. In Hess the Court said that "having the power so to exclude, the
State may declare that the use of the highway by the nonresident is the equivalent
of the appointment of the registrar as agent on whom process may be served."'
17
The motorist's fictitious consent to such appointment was denied later by the Su-
preme Court when it said that "the liability rests [rather] on the inroad which the
automobile has made on the decision of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, as it has on
so many aspects of our social scene."' 8 In fact, "the service depends on no consent,
actual or implied, but merely upon declarations of the legislature in the valid exer-
cise of the police power of the State."' 9
In many state decisions regarding the purpose and justification of this sort of
legislation, the same rationale of "valid exercise of the police power" is followed.
Thus, it is said:
The basis of jurisdiction is the fact of doing acts or causing them to be
done, in the state, the acts being of a type so affecting the public interest, in
that they are apt to give rise to causes of action in local citizens, that such
police regulation as is represented by these statutes is allowable.
2 0
More frequent than the theory of "acts . . . affecting the public interest" are
references to "cases in which the defendant or his agent has performed within the
state an act traditionally characterized as dangerous to life or property." 2'1 Another
frequently found rationale, enunciated in Hess, is that "in the public interest the
state may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on
the part of all, residents and non-residents alike, who use its highways."22 In stressing
local interests, another and probably more important motivation is that of giving
residents of the state the same protection against nonresident drivers as against resi-
inconsistent with due process. But Judge L. Hand in Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d
942 (2d Cir. 1934) held that the owner would not be liable if the auto were taken into an-
other state without the owner's consent. Lorenzen, in Developments in the Conflict of Laws,
1902-1942, 40 MIcH. L. REv. 781, says: "The law was settled in this country at the beginning
of the century that the law of the state in which a tort was committed, that is, where the injury
or harm was done, determined the substantive rights of the parties."
12 Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641, 648 (4th Cir. 1961). See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAws, § 84a (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956); ILL. STAT.
ANN. ch. 110, § 17 (1)(c) (1956).
13 Apparently only Alaska does not. For a list of the nonresident motorist statutes, see 44
IowA L. Rav. 384 (1959).
14 The statute, upheld in Kane v. State of New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916), was subse-
quently replaced.
15 274U.S. 352 (1927).
16 MAss. GEN. LAws, ch. 90, as amended by St. Mass., ch. 431, § 2 (1923).
17 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-357 (1927).
18 Olberding v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953).
19 Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill. 591, 114 N.E.2d 686, 690 (1953).
20 Leflar, THE LAw OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, 50-51 (1959).
21 Developments in the Law - State Court jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. Rav. 909, 946
(1960).
22 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927). But see Gibbons, A Survey of the Modern
Nonresident Motorist Statutes, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 257, 259 (1960): "This view of the statutes
is widely accepted by state judges today, yet it is doubtful that, absent these statutes, non-
residents would drive more carelessly because of an anticipation of an immunity from the incon-
venience of local jurisdiction. At any rate, the idea that these statutes are merely a species of
traffic regulations was not the major consideration behind their adoption."
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dent drivers. This is accomplished by giving local residents access to local courts
in actions against nonresident tortfeasors.
23
In attempting to establish what is probably a broader basis of jurisdiction in
such cases than the usual police power rationale, the court in Davis adopted both
the interest-analysis approach suggested in a Harvard Law Review article, Develop-
ments in the Law - State Court Jurisdiction,24 and standards to be met in acquir-
ing constitutionally valid, in personam jurisdiction over corporations, as set forth in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.
2 5
The Shoe case standard is fairness to all interested parties once certain "min-
imum contacts" were established. In fact, Shoe "may be merely a logical extension
of the Hess and Doherty2 6 holdings. Those cases explicitly recognized that state
interests are relevant in determining whether it is fair to assert jurisdiction over
nonresidents, and therefore should be viewed as limited precursors of International
Shoe."27 According to International Shoe, the question whether due process is satis-
fied "must depend . . . upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to
the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due
process clause to insure. '" 28 And this can be determined "only by weighing the com-
peting interests." 29
Such a weighing of the interests in cases growing out of automobile accidents
is found in the Davis opinion. The defendant has, in opposition to the interests of
the forum state and the plaintiff, a definite interest in not being called upon to
defend in the foreign state. It will usually be inconvenient and costly, involving
disruption of his affairs and the necessity of obtaining unfamiliar counsel.30 In
any suit out of his own state, the hardships on the individual are likely to be greater,
relatively, than they are on an out-of-state corporation. 3' The plaintiff's interests
usually include the convenience to him in bringing the action in his own state, where
the witnesses are readily available, and where the jury may view the scene of the
accident. Generally, it is "more desirable for an action to be tried in the state
whose law is applicable." 32 And finally, "in fairness to the plaintiff, he should not
be deprived of jurisdiction over any defendant against whom there is a reasonable
possibility of liability being proved at the trial. 13 3 Generally:
23 Austinson v. Kilpatrick, 82 N.W.2d 388 (N.D. 1957); Tardiff v. Bank Line, Ltd., 127
F.Supp. 945, 948 (E.D. La. 1954).
24 73 HARv. L. Rav. 909 (1960).
25 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
26 In Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935), the constitutionality of
an Iowa statute was upheld - authorizing service of process on a business agent of defendant,
in any action arising out of the conduct of an office established by the defendant for the
transaction of business in any county other than his own - as applied to a nonresident indi-
vidual who established an office in the state for dealing in securities, a business subject to
special regulation by the state.
27 Developments in the Law - State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HRv. L. REv. 909, 947
(1960).
28 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
29 Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641, 647 (4th Cir. 1961). See Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). This "weighing" usually in-
volves considerations similar to those involved in forum non conveniens. It is suggested,
therefore, that the courts assume a positive function in such cases "of identifying the forum
conventens in terms of substantial contacts such as the plaintiff's residence, the origin of the
cause of action, or the presence of property." Ehrenzweig, supra note 1, at 312. See also
Stimson, Limitations on the Exercise of Jurisdiction In Personam, 10 HAsTINGS L.J. 139, 143
(1958).
30 Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641, 647 (4th Cir. 1961).
31 Ibid.; Developments in the Law - State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HArtv. L. RFv. 909, 936
(1960). See Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir.
1956).
32 Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641, 647 (4th Cir. 1961). See Travel-
ers Health Assoc. v. Virginia ex rel State Corporation Commission, 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950).
33 Gibbons, A Survey of the Modern Nonresident Motorist Statutes, 13 U. FLA. L. RuV.
257, 283 (1960).
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[T]he realities of automobile accident litigation point' clearly to the situs
of the accident as the most desirable place to conduct a determination of the
merits of these controversies. One of the parties involved may be forced to
travel to the distant forum to testify - a factor that cancels out, since there
is no reason to prefer one party over the other. However, the annoyance
and expense of employing foreigR counsel to appear at the trial are less dis-
advantageous to the defendant in the usual case, in which his insurer as-
sumes this obligation and has established local contacts. It is true that one
party must be prepared to face a jury composed of his opponentes neighbors,
but the widespread prevalence, indeed in many states the requirement, of
automobile liability insurance tends to diminish any niggardly attitude even
of a jury selected from residents of the defendant's locale.34
In the Davis case, the interests of the plaintiff and of the state itself prevailed.
It would seem that when the defendant's interests would be expected to prevail,
correspondingly, "sufficient contacts ' 3 5 will not be found.
The interests of the state, the third interested party in such suits, were taken
into account and characterized from the earliest days of such litigation. Because
automobiles are "dangerous machines," it has been said, the state has a "strong
interest in being able to provide a convenient forum where its citizens may be able
to seek, from the owner as well as from the actual operator, compensation for in-
juries that will often be extremely serious."3 6 And the state's interest in encouraging
careful driving is served, for, conversely, "knowledge by nonresident motorists that
they are not amenable to suit in the foreign state may encourage negligent con-
duct."37 Similarly, in defense of another sort of nonresident jurisdictional statute,
it is said that "Iowa treats the business of dealing in corporate securities as excep-
tional, and subjects it to special regulation." 38 Thus it seems that the state's interest
in "exceptional activity" as a class, as a result of which activity its citizens may be
damaged, 9 and in providing redress "against persons who, having substantial con-
tacts with the State, incur obligations to those entitled to the State's protection,"4 0
34 Id. at 261.
35 47 GEo. L.J. 342, 357 (1958):
"[Tihe tests used for forum non conveniens are not the only considera-
tions for valid jurisdiction over a nonresident. They do go a long way,
however, toward indicating whether there has been a substantial contact with
the forum. If, for example, a court would feel obliged to reject jurisdiction
under the forum non conveniens doctrine, there would be a rather unsub-
stantial contact with that forum by the defendant."
36 Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641, 648 (4th Cir. 1961); Olberding
v. Illinois Central R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953) stressing "the potentialities of damage by a
motorist, in a population as mobile as ours, such that those whom he injures must have oppor-
tunities of redress against him provided only that he is afforded an opportunity to defend
himself"; Nelson v. Miller, 11 IIll. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673, 676 (1957) ; 44 IowA L. Ruv. 248,
252 (1959). That the extent of a state's need to exercise jurisdiction in a certain situation is
to be considered in determining whether such jurisdiction exists, see Mullane v. Central Han-
over Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950):
"It is sufficient to observe that whatever the technical definition of its
chosen procedure, the interest of each state in providing means to close
trusts that exist by the grace of its laws and are administered under the
supervision of its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish
beyond doubt the right of its courts to determine the interests of all claimants,
resident or nonresident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity to
appear and be heard."
37 Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641, 648 (4th Cir. 1961).
38 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 627 (1935).
39 Cf. Cleary, The Length of the Long Ann, 9 J. op PuB. L. 293, 297 (1960):
"A state is 'interested' in every kind of liability which it permits to be
established in its courts. The passage of regulatory legislation in regard to
such things as automobiles, insurance, and securities sales merely indicates
that the traditional common-law treatment of these matters has not proved
satisfactory. Failure to adopt special measures indicates satisfaction with the
status quo, not lack of interest."
40 Nelson v. Miller, 11111. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673, 679 (1957).
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are strong enough to support that state's assertion of jurisdiction over nonresidents in
appropriate cases.
Perhaps the most important question involved in the approach to these juris-
dictional cases adopted in Davis, involved the required "minimum contacts." The
question, which was passed over with little comment by the Davis court, is: Did
the presence in the forum state of the nonresident defendant's automobile, driven
by a sub-permittee, constitute minimum contacts sufficient to enable the state to
validly exercise jurisdiction? It seems that the degree of contact in the Davis situ-
ation is sufficient. The state courts have not formulated the problem in precisely
this way, but they and the federal courts have faced and met the problem.
Generally, to support jurisdiction where a sub-permittee is involved, there must
be some peg such as a theory of agency, 41 or the family purpose doctrine, 42 upon
which a charge of liability can be hung.43 It seems that,
[I]f there is no consent to the operator's possession, the owner has done
nothing that would give the state of the place of the injury a connecting
link. [And] under Judge Hand's point of view, even though there may be
consent to possession but no consent expressly or impliedly to take the car
to the state of the accident, the owner-bailor would not be responsible nor
would he be amenable to the jurisdiction of a court there.
4 4
Some courts say that "proof or admission of ownership by the defendant of the
motor vehicle involved in an accident is sufficient to make out a prima facie case
of agency which will support, but not compel, a verdict against the owner under
the doctrine of respondeat .superior for damages proximately caused by the negli-
gence of the nonowner operator of the motor vehicle."
45 Although many states
still construe their statutes in this area strictly, the most desirable attitude is that
the jurisdictional statute is to be interpreted to mean that whoever is a nonresident
and may be legally liable in tort to the injured party may be served.
48
41 McDonald v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. App. 2d 621, 275 P.2d 464 (1954).
42 Ewing v. Thompson, 233 N.C. 564, 65 S.E.2d 17 (1951); Norwood v. Parthemos, 230
S.C. 207, 95 S.E.2d 168 (1956).
43 See generally Stumberg, Extension of Nonresident Motorist Statutes to Those Not
Operators, 44 IOWA L. REv. 268, 270-271 (1959):
"None of the statutes in the United States purports to impose liability
upon the bailor or to bring him within the terms of the nonresident motorist
provisions unless he has consented to the operator's taking possession; but if
a local statute were so construed as to impose liability on a nonconsenting
owner, as where the injury is inflicted while the car is in the possession of
a wrongdoer such as a thief, the view of Judge Hand [in Scheer v. Rockne
Motors Corp. 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934)] would be all the more ap-
plicable."
44 Stumberg, supra note 43, at 271. Statutes clearly permitting service on nonresident
owners who consent to the use of their cars are: Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-502 (1956);
CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 404; FLA. STAT. § 47.29 (1957); IOWA CODE § 321.499(3) (1958);
MICH. COmP. LAWS § 257.403 (Supp. 1952); N.Y. VEHICLE &'TRAFFIC LAW § 253; WASH.
REV. CODE § 46.64.040 (1957).
45 Howard v. Sasso, 253 N.C. 185, 116 S.E.2d 341 (1960) quoting Lynn v. Clark, 252
N.C. 289, 292, 113 S.E.2d 427, 430 and cases there cited. Contra: Wilson v. Hazard, 145
F.Supp. 23 (D. Mass. 1956). See Gibbons, supra note 21, at 260, n. 13: Where an owner
is made subject to jurisdiction when his vehicle is driven with his permission "an argument has
been made that to assume jurisdiction over the owner by presuming his permission to the
driver might be violative of the owner's constitutional rights." In Bowman v. Atlanta Bag-
gage & Cab Co., 173 F.Supp.- 282 (N.D. Fla. 1959), jurisdiction was upheld in such a case,
despite contractual limitations on the lessee's authority to drive the vehicle in that state.
46 Gibbons, supra note 33, at 278: "In a growing minority of jurisdictions, . . . owners
of vehicles involved in accidents are covered if the vehicle was being driven with the 'per-
mission, consent, or acquiescence of the owner.'" That "operator" means one for whose
purposes the vehicle is being used: Pray v. Meier, 69 Ohio App. 141, 43 N.E.2d 318 (1942);
Boulay v. Pontikes, 93 F.Supp. 826 (W.D. Mo. 1950); Weaver v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc.,
6 Ohio Op. 2d 267, 160 F.Supp. 621 (N.D. Ohio 1958). It was held in Kentucky v. Maryland
Casualty Co. of Baltimore, 112 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1940) that where a petition did not state
a cause of action under the family purpose doctrine, attempted service on the Secretary of
State as defendant's agent was void and of no effect as not "due process of law" within the 14th
Amendment, and a default judgment pursuant to it was void.
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[But] in general the courts have officially ignored this problem and
adopted the narrow view of these statutes, leaving the task of reducing any
possible jurisdictional lag to the legislatures. There are signs of progress,
however, in a few recent cases that have suggested that the question of the
existence of substantive liability may be a proper factor in determining juris-
dictional coverage. 47
The force of the "exceptional activity" rationale, in the "dangerous instrumen-
tality" formulation, 4 8 seems to support the conclusion that, in regard to the motorist,
the driving or procuring, 9 or directing of driving, within the foreign state provides
sufficient contacts, so that jurisdiction may later 'be exercised in the event of an
"accident."9's In other cases, the doing of business is sufficient for a cause of action
arising out of that business.5 However, since some states have statutes providing for
judicial jurisdiction over nonresidents as to causes of action arising from one or
more isolated acts done by them within the state,5 2 and since some courts achieve
the same effect by defining "doing business" to cover doing isolated acts,53 it may
be that "the fact that the injury is a local one gives rise to sufficient interest to
permit application of the law of that place."5 4 In Nelson v. Miller,5 the Illinois
Supreme Court said:
The rational basis of the decisions upholding the nonresident motorist
statutes is broad enough to include the case in which the nonresident de-
fendant causes injury without the intervention 6f any particular instrumental-
ity. The legislature may direct its policy to the fact of injury as well as to
its probability.56
The United States Supreme Court has suggested that certain single acts, such
as are the basis of nonresident motorist cases, "because of their nature and quality
and the circumstances of their commission, may be -deemed sufficient to render the
corporation liable to suit, 5 7 and, supposedly, the individual. Whatever the quali-
ties that specifically distinguish activities out of which nonresident jurisdiction may
47 Gibbons, supra note 33, at 283, citing Culver v. Tucker, 182 F.Supp. 385 (N.D. Fla.
1960) and Thomas v. Warren, 162 F. Supp. 101 (D. Mont. 1958).
48 The "most popular rationale with the states today, since 'consent was laid to rest."
Gibbons, A Survey of the Modern Nonresident Motorist Statutes, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 257, 259
(1960).
49 Leggett v. Crossnoe, 206 Tenn. 700, 336 S.W.2d 1 (1960): held that "any nonresident
. who . . . shall procure the use of a motor vehicle licensed under the laws of this state,"
includes parents who merely joined in the application for the license which their minor son
could not otherwise have obtained.
50 Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 258 (1933): "A person who sets in motion in one State
the means by which injury is inflicted in another may, consistently with the due process clause,
be made liable for that injury whether the means employed be a responsible agent or an.
irresponsible instrument." In W. H. Elliott & Sons Co. v. Nuodex Products Co., 243 F.2d 116
(1st Cir. 1957), jurisdiction was upheld where consequences following in the other state could
reasonably have been expected. Jurisdiction even lawfully extends to personal representatives of
nonresident deceased motorists, in actions for wrongful death. State ex rel Sullivan v. Cross, 314
S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1958). For a list of other such cases, see 25 Mo. L. Rav. 83 (1960).
51 Smyth v. Twin State'Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664, 667 (1951): "The
exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations . . . [which] require the corporation to
respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue."
See ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 110, § 17 (1) (1956).
52 Cleary, supra note 39, at 299. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoN) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84,
Reporter's Note (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
53 Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
54 Stumberg, supra note 43, at 269. See Leflar, The Converging Limits of State Jurisdic-
tional Powers, 9 J. OF Pun. L. 282, 283 (1960):
"There is reason to believe that some of the older due process choice-of-
substantive-law cases in which the United States Supreme Court required
forum courts to apply another state's law despite the forum's having sub-
stantial connection with the facts will be overruled or narrowly distinguished
when the court has appropriate opportunities thus to discard them."
55 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
56 Id. at 679.
57 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). See 44 IOWA L. REv.
374, 375 (1959).
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grow, the Court has made it clear that it "is essential that there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activ-
ities within the... State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."15 8
It is perhaps in connection with this idea that the Davis court states that "far
more important" than any "momentary physical presence of the defendant within
the state" are the "consequences foreseeable from his authorizing the use of his
automobile there."59 Although the statement is not clarified as to the exact impor-
tance of these "consequences foreseeable," it would seem that they are the reason
why the "ownership of property, particularly that which is capable of. inflicting
serious injury, may fairly be coupled with an obligation upon the owner to stand
suit where the property is or has been taken with his consent."6 0 This court has also
retained the usual reference to the "dangerous instrumentality,161 to the possible
effects of which the court probably meant to advert in speaking of "consequences
foreseeable."
Combined with these other elements, the holding draws additional strength
from the concept of in personam jurisdiction based on ownership of property in
the forum state. Usually the sort of property which supports jurisdiction is real
property,62 but it seems that "a relation to personalty may constitute as substantial
a contact with the state in which it is located as a relation to realty,"6 13 especially
when the personalty is a chattel as large, valuable, and potentially dangerous as an
automobile.6 4 In addition, "personalty receives protection from the laws of the juris-
diction in which it is presently located as does real property."65 This assertion of
jurisdiction is surely "within limitations of reasonableness appropriate to the relation-
ship derived from the ownership of the thing."6 6
The opinion contains a sufficient basis for its conclusion, although, in the end,
much of what is said seems superfluous. Although an analysis of the different
interests to be balanced may be useful in the abstract, the analysis in Davis of these
factors had nothing to do with the concrete, individual interests of the particular
parties involved in the lawsuit at hand. It was a foregone conclusion that juris-
diction would be upheld if it were found "reasonable" to hold the defendant sub-
stantively liable.67 Since "unquestionably a state in which an automobile tort was
committed has . . . some interest in being able to open its courts to the action,'68
and since the consent of the owner to its use in that state would be sufficient as a
58 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Cf. International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman 294 U.S. 623, 626-627
(1935), citing, Davidson v. H. L. Doherty & Co., 214 Iowa 739, 241 N.W. 700, 702 (1932):
"The justice of such a statute is obvious. It places no greater or different
burden upon the nonresident than upon the resident of this state.... A non-
resident who gets all the benefit of the protection of the laws of this state
with regard to the office or agency and the business so transacted ought to
be amenable to the laws of the state as to transactions growing out of such
business upon the same basis and conditions as govern residents of this state.
... It makes no hostile discrimination against non-residents, but tends to
put them on the same footing as residents. .. ."
59 Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641, 648 (4th Cir. 1961). See Pugh
v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 157 F.Supp. 155 (E. D. La. 1958); 44 VA. L. Rv.
999 (1958).
60 Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641, 648 (4th Cir. 1961).
61 "[P]roperty ... capable of inflicting serious injury," Ibid.
62 Dubin v. City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. Rep. 61 (Phil. Co. Ct. 1938). ILL. STAT.
ANN. ch. 110, §§ 16, 17 (1956).
63 44 IowA L. REV. 374, 382 (1959).
64 Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641, 648 (4th Cir. 1961). "When a
person engages in activities in a particular jurisdiction he can, with good reason, be required
to expect inconvenient consequences to arise therefrom - such as appearing in that state to
defend a lawsuit." 44 IowA L. Rav. 374, 378 (1959).
65 44 IowA L. REv. 374, 382 (1959).
66 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) CONFLICT OF LAws § 84a (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
67 See notes 34 & 35 supra and accompanying text.
68 Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641, 648 (4th Cir. 1961).
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basis both for an assertion of substantive liability as well as jurisdictionI' the hold-
ing in terms of "ownership of property" seems inappropriate. It seems that, if the
defendant was subject to substituted service according to state law, the decision on
the validity of that particular holding should take into account the terms in which
it is necessarily couched - the terms of the nonresident motorist statute, which do
not limit themselves to situations where the defendant is the owner of the auto-
mobile. There may be jurisdiction for any action "growing out of any accident or
collision in which said nonresident may be involved by reason of the operation by
him, for him, or under his control or direction, express or implied, of a motor
vehicle..."TO
Lawrence J. Gallick
PERPETUITIES - BUSINESS LEASE FOR A TERM To COMMENCE UPON COM-
PLETION OF A BUILDING DOES NOT VIOLATE THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES. -
Plaintiff Isen owned options on some land. Isen contracted with defendant Giant
Food to enter into a lease at some time in the future, contingent upon Isen obtain-
ing commercial zoning for the land. The lease which was contemplated provided
that its term was not to begin until Isen completed a building upon the property
concerned.
After Isen had obtained the required zoning, Giant Food refused to enter into
the lease, and a lawsuit ensued. At trial, Giant Food urged that both the contract
and the proposed lease violated the Rule Against Perpetuities, and obtained sum-
mary judgment in its favor., On appeal to the United States Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia, held: reversed. The contract contemplated that plaintiffs
obtain the zoning within a reasonable time (which would certainly be less than 21
years), and the lease, if entered into, would have vested an immediate interest in
Giant Food and thus have prevented application of the Rule. Isen v. Giant Food,
Inc., 295 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
This opinion is a welcome injection of good sense into an area of commercial
law which has been too long muddled. It is common practice to lease space in
unconstructed buildings - often before the foundation is laid - to ensure sufficient
tenants to make the construction commercially feasible, to obtain payments in ad-
vance, and to lend security to backers. The practice is particularly widespread in
the shopping center business, where it is a valuable promotion device.
Lawyers drafting such "future leases" before 1958 could obtain some assurance
of their validity from older English and American cases, such as Redington v.
Browne' and Gex v. Dill,2 which, while perhaps blurring over ancient conceptual
distinctions between "vested" and "non-vested" interests, seemed to hold that a
lease term to begin on a contingency was nevertheless valid (as against the Rule),
if it should appear that the contingency was highly likely to occur within a reason-
able time, and within the period of the Rule's operation.3
This situation was changed for the worse by the 1958 decision in Haggerty v.
City of Oakland,4 where a California appellate court held that a lease whose term
69 Cf. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957), RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
CONFLrCT or LAws § 84 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956). See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
70 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-105 (Supp. 1959).
1 32 L.R. Ir. 347 (1893).
2 86 Miss. 10, 38 So. 193 (1905).
3 Gex v. Dill, for instance, is bottomed on the likelihood that a turpentine merchant, who
has a lease on land to "commence bowing, working, and using the said timber ... at any time,"
to run for three years thereafter, is going to start doing so within a reasonable time. See also
Kirkland v. Odum, 156 Ga. 131, 118 S.E. 706 (1923); Fletcher v. Moriarty, 62 Fla. 482, 56
So. 437 (1911). All the American and British cases are collected in an exhaustive annotation
at 66 A.L.R.2d 733 (1959).
4 161 Cal. App.2d 407, 326 P.2d 957 (1958).
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was to begin upon completion of a certain municipal building was voided by the
possibility that the building might not be finished within 21 years. Although Bray,
J., dissented scathingly, calling the result "legalistic formalism completely out of
step with modem concepts and conditions,"5 and Leach characterized the decision
as "an absurd result," it remained a source of great concern that the Haggerty
rationale might be accepted by other courts in search of the rare authorities in the
area. The subsequent decision in Southern Airways Co. v. De Kalb County,
7
although reversed on appeal, gave a hint of possible legal difficulties to come. There,
Southern Airways had a lease on the De Kalb County airport, to begin after the
U.S. Government relinquished control over the property. At the time of trial, the
Government had what amounted to a perpetual privilege to renew. In support of
its finding that the Southern Airways lease violated the Rule, the court cited Hag-
gerty. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed with the terse statement that "a valid
lease, the term of which is to commence in the future, may be made," but failed to
discuss or distinguish Haggerty."
Although another California appellate court, faced with a similar but not iden-
tical problem, observed in a gratuitous dictum that if the case before it were identical,
it would not follow Haggerty,9 the situation remained in considerable doubt.
This is the way things stood when the instant case arose in the District of
Columbia.
The Rule Against Perpetuities is among the more complex and abstruse areas
of our common law of property. The reasons for the complication are many, but
perhaps the most important is that there are, basically, two views of the purpose
and function of the Rule. The tension between these two views has been appropri-
ately termed a "battleground of jurisprudence."'0
One view, represented by John Chipman Gray's influential treatise, is that the
Rule is directed primarily against "remoteness of vesting" and only secondarily
against "suspension of alienability."" Under this view, the Rule forbids the creation
of remote future interests even where the land subject to the interest remains fully
alienable by persons in being.
Under a second view of the Rule, an interest is good, though remote, so long
as there are persons in being (within the period of the Rule) who can convey a fee
simple. It is likely that this view was held by the framers of the New York Revised
Statutes who, in purporting to codify the Rule, stated that:
Every future estate shall be void in its creation, which shall suspend the
absolute power of alienation for a longer period than is prescribed in this
Article. Such power of alienation is suspended, where there are no persons
in being, by whom the absolute fee in possession can be conveyed.' 2
The revisers did not specifically state whether their codification was intended
to replace the common law or merely to declare part of it. Consequently, in New
5 Id. at 968.
6 Leach, Perpetuities: New Absurdity, judicial and Statutory Correctives, 73 H.xv. L.
REv. 1318 (1960).
7 101 Ga. App. 689, 115 S.E.2d 207 (1960).
8 216 Ga. 358, 116 S.E.2d 602, 607 (1960).
9 City of Santa Cruz v. MacGregor, 178 Cal. App. 2d 45, 2 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1960); Cf.
Oliver v. Schene, 182 Cal. App. 473, 6 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1960).
10 Rollison, The History of Estate Planning, 37 NOTRE DAMuE LAWYER 160, 167 (1961).
11 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 4 (4th ed., Roland Gray, 1942).
12 Id. at 681. Gray considers it a mistake to view the Rule as directed primarily against
restraints on alienation. This accusation may be unfair as regards the framers of the Revised
Statutes, as it was not until later in the 19th century that it was finally declared by the English
courts that an interest might be void for remoteness even where there were living persons who
could convey the fee. London & S.W. Ry. v. Gomm, L.R. Ch. D. 20 (1882). As to subsequent
legislation modeled on the New York statute, the language used might be construed as a limita-
tion on the common law rule, and as sanction for the creation of remote interests where the
land remains alienable within the perpetuities period. See, e.g., Mineral Land Inv. Co. v.
Bishop Iron Co., 134 Minn. 412, 159 N.W. 966 (1916): "The common law rule against per-
petuities is superseded by statute."
RECENT DECISIONS
York and in the other states which adopted the New York scheme, it remained in
doubt for many years (and in some states to this day) whether future interests could
be created which, though remote, did not suspend the power of alienation. The
debate goes on, but the toughness of the common law and the pre-eminent influence
of the Gray work are such that it is sometimes held that statutes of the New York
type, even where enacted long after the common law rule against remoteness became
crystal clear, do not abrogate the rule against remoteness in codifying the rule
against suspension of alienation.13 This is unfortunate, in a sense, because if the
statutory view were to prevail, no simple lease would ever be voided by the Rule.
In the instant case, the circuit court was dealing with Virginia law. That state
has no statutory Rule, and thus the common law rule is in force. The Gray formula-
tion of the common law rule, which has been widely adopted, is that "no future
interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after
some life in being -at the creation of the interest.' 4 The Virginia rule is not signifi-
cantly different, though stated in converse: "An executory interest which, by possi-
bility, may not take effect until after lives in being and twenty-one years and ten.
months, is ipso facto and ab initio void."'-'
The instant case involves two "perpetuities situations": (1) the initial contract
between Isen and Giant Food and (2) the lease agreement itself. They will be dis-
cussed in order. The initial contract obliged Giant Food to enter the lease only after
Isen had obtained favorable zoning. Such a contract to lease is subject to the Rule,16
and it is fairly clear that no recognized interest "vested" in Giant Food as of the
making of the agreement; it is also quite clear that the contract might not take
effect or be rescinded until after twenty-one years and ten months. [When no lives
in being are involved the Rule period becomes twenty-one years.] This is because
the zoning application might conceivably be delayed for that length of time and
because Giant Food might conceivably wait that long for its building (although the
latter is highly unlikely). Thus, one would expect, the contract is void.
Not so, said the court. Since Isen was to "diligently pursue" the zoning applica-
tion and obtain zoning "as soon as possible" it is obvious that the zoning was
required to be obtained within a xeasonable time, which time would certainly be
well within the perpetuities period.
This holding is a significant departure from traditional perpetuities learning.
The question of "reasonable time' does not usually enter into the calculations,' the
courts finding a remote possibility of non-vesting even where the overwhelming
probabilities are in favor of vesting. Thus it has been held that a woman of greatly
advanced age or a babe in arms might bear children, the so-called "fertile octo-
genarian" and "precocious infan' rules.'8The Isen court refreshingly ignores this line of cases in favor of recognizing
commercial reality. The possibility of Giant Food waiting twenty-one years to enter a
favorable market area - or to decide not to - is distinctly contrary to American
retail practices. The court is to be commended on its good sense.
The second "perpetuities situation" involves the actual lease contemplated by
the contract. Although the parties never entered into the lease, owing to Giant
Food's breach of contract, attorneys for the defense argued that the court should
"read it together" with the prior agreement, to show the heinousness of the transac-
tion. The court obligingly did so, though not with the result expected.
The lease, you will remember, would have provided that Giant Food was to
have the property for a term to commence on Isen completing a building on the lot.
13 Gray v. Gray, 300 Ky. 265, 268-70, 188 S.W.2d 440, 442-43 (1945).
14 GRAY, op. cit. supra note 11 § 201.
15 Burruss v. Baldwin, 199 Va. 883, 103 S.E.2d 249, 252 (1958).
16 For this proposition the Isen court cites SszEs AND SMITi, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1242
(2d ed. 1956).
17 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 24.21 (1952).
18 Id. at § 24.22.
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The instrument itself provided that it was a present lease.'9 Had the instrument
been, say, a deed granting a fee simple to Giant Food subject to a life estate in Isen,
the interest of Giant Food would be considered to be "vested," and would be quite
good. On the other hand, if the Haggerty case above were followed, the lease as
contemplated is void, ab initio.
There is obviously an inconsistency in a Rule which permits postponement of
enjoyment until a healthy man's death but forbids a limitation on a contingency
which will in all likelihood take place much sooner. In this particular instance, the
inconsistency flows from the conceptual limitations of the idea of "vesting."
According to one accepted formulation a future interest is "vested" where it is
ascertained as to person and "subject to no condition precedent other than the
termination of preceding vested estates.12 0 A leasehold term to commence on the
completion of a building is subject to a condition precedent other than that indi-
cated; ergo, one would suppose, it is not "vested" and will violate the Rule if it may
continue in that state for twenty-one years. This is, of course, in the face of the fact
that a leasehold is among the most freely alienable of all the possible future land
entanglemenfs, since there will always be a lessor and lessee, or successors thereof,
who can convey the fee.
The idea of "vesting," fruit of a law of freehold estates and seisin, will not
quite handle the leasehold-perpetuities area without a little legal surgery, which the
Isen court failed to perform.
The court ignored the "vesting" problem and merely cited a Virginia case (in-
volving vested remainders - quite a different situation) for the proposition that
"an interest in property is vested when there exists a present right to possession at
either a present or future time," 21 from which (the court said) it follows that the
proposed lease, if entered into, would have been outside the operation of the Rule
Against Perpetuities.
This failure to deal with the vesting problem is unfortunate. Although it has
been wisely said that the problem of the lease for a future term ought to be decided
on the basis of the policy behind the Rule,22 the fact remains that our property law
heritage would force all but the most revolutionary court to talk in terms of the
concepts which have come down to us. The Rule Against Perpetuities has not lent
itself to "policy arguments."
It would seem difficult enough to deal with our logically inspired heritage in
terms of its rather carefully defined concepts; it is doubly so where, as here, courts
appear to be confusing these concepts, and use an example of the "sort of interest
which does vest" to prove that another interest, of a different sort, vested also.
There existed to the hand of the Isen court two ways out of the vesting dilemma,
either of which, it is submitted, would have been preferable to the route it did take.
It could have said, as it did with respect to the contract, that the lease term would
begin "within a reasonable time," having regard to commercial reality. Or it could
have used another tool, of indisputable feudal respectability, called the interesse
termini, or "interest of a term."
This obscure little interest is first mentioned in Coke, who sets out that the
lessee under a lease whose term begins in the future owns an "interesse termini.1
23
Simes and Smith note in their treatise that the old law did not treat the "interesse
termini" as the sort of interest which vests, and advise that arguments about vesting
19 "Landlord does hereby lease and demise unto the Tenant . . .the building to be con-
structed," 259 F.2d at 138.
20 SIMES AND SMITH, op. cit. supra note 16, § 1232.
21 259 F.2d at 138. The Virginia case was Allison v. Allison's Ex'rs, 101 Va. 537, 44 S.E.
904 (1903).
22 SIMES AND SMITH, op. cit. supra note 16, § 1242.
23 2 Co. LITT. 270a.
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will not resolve the "future lease" problem; rather, as mentioned above, they urge
a policy decision. 24 However, it seems clear from the instant case and the meager
precedents that the courts prefer to speak in terms of the old concepts. Therefore,
a square holding that the lessee under a lease for a future term takes. a vested interest
called an "interesse termini" would have'been preferable to the actual holding, bot-
tomed on an easily distinguishable remainders case. It would have been better
because it would be less easily escaped by a future court bent on applying the Rule
in all its pristine vigor. The "reasonable time" alternative would also have been
preferable for the same reasons.
Modem British courts have, in fact, treated the "interesse termini" as a vested
interest; thus did the Irish court in Redington v. Browne,25 and the English Chancery
Division in Mann v. Registrar," in which latter case the proposition is explicitly
stated.
Regardless of these possible technical deficiencies, the essential importance of
the instant case should not pass unremarked. It has now been recognized unequivo-
cally by the D.C. Circuit that commercial leases for terms to begin in the future do
not necessarily violate the Rule Against Perpetuities, a holding which should render
a useful security and promotion device relatively free of the danger of being held
void, and should be a useful antidote to "legalistic formalism" in the Perpetuities area.
Joseph P. Summers
SALES - IMPLIED WARRANTY - No WARRANTY IN BLOOD TRANSFUSION BY
HOSPITAL. - Plaintiff sued defendant hospital for the wrongful ddath of a patient
as the result of a transfusion of improper blood, for which decedent was to be
charged $200. The case was presented solely on the theory of breach of an implied
warranty that the transfused blood would be fit for 'the purpose intended by the
purchaser. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Utah, held: affirmed. A hospital does not sell blood used in transfusions;
thus no warranty of fitness can arise from the transaction. Dibblee v. Dr. W. H.
Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 364 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1961).
Webster defines a "warranty" as:
A collateral engagement or undertaking, express or implied, that a certain
fact regarding the subject of a contract is, or shall be, as it is expressly or
impliedly declared or promised to be. Breach of such an engagement does
not avoid the contract, but renders the warrantor liable for damages.1
Section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act states that:
Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller
the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears
that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the
grower or manufacturer or not) there is an implied warranty that the goods
shall be reasonably fit for such purpose.
2
Since the Sales Act is couched in terms of buyers and sellers, any warranty
sought to be implied under the Act must of necessity arise out of a sale. From this
fact has arisen a great deal of learned controversy and judicial dissertation, of
which the instant case is but one example. The Act itself defines a "sale" as: An
agreement whereby the seller transfers the property in goods to the buyer for a
consideration called a price."s
The issue of whether a hospital warrants the fitness of blood it gives to its
24 Supra, note 22.
25 32 L.R. Ir. 347 (1893).
26 [1918] 1 Ch. 202.
1 WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2877 (2d ed. 1960).
2 UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15(1).
3 UNIFORM SALES ACT § 1(2).
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patients has only three times been presented to the courts. In each case the hos-
pital was held free of liability.4
The leading case dealing with the problem is Perlmutter v. Beth David Hos-
pital,5 a New York case which was heavily relied upon by the Utah court in the
instant decision. In Perlmutter the New York court held, in a 4-3 decision, that
no cause of action in warranty was made out by a complaint which stated that:
[Tihe blood used in the transfusion was sold by the defendant to the
plaintiff for $60; and that defendant, who knew the purpose for which the
blood was to be used and upon whose skill and judgment plaintiff relied,
impliedly warranted that the blood was fit for such purpose. 6
The court based its decision on a finding that there was no "sale" of the blood
within the meaning of the Uniform Sales Act,7 and thus no warranty.
When service predominates, and the transfer of personal property is but
an incidental feature of the transaction, the transaction is not deemed a
sale within the Sales Act.... There is no doubt that the main object sought
to be accomplished in this case was the care and treatment of the patient.
• . . The conclusion is evident that the furnishing of blood was only an
incidental and very secondary adjunct to the services performed....
[W]hen one enters a hospital as a patient; he goes there not to buy
medicine or pills, not to purchase bandages or iodine or serum or blood, but
to obtain a course of treatment in the hope of being cured of what ails him.8
The dissent in Perlmutter criticized the holding as essentially an extension of
the doctrine of charitable immunity, pointing out that previously, hospitals had
been free from liability only where the tort was committed by a nurse or doctor,
such persons being deemed independent contractors. In Perlmutter, noted the dis-
sent, the hospital itself had supplied the blood, not an independent contractor.9
Although Perlmutter has been generously criticized by the law reviews, 0 it
has been followed by the courts."
The reasoning of the Perlmutter case and its progeny is not novel. In the
early days of the Sales Act, and at common law, it was widely held that a restau-
rant did not warrant the quality of the food it served, since no sale took place.
The courts said that the serving of food was an "utterance" and not a "sale,"
because a person had no right to take home what he did not eat, and because
he entered a restaurant primarily for the services he would receive there.'? With
respect to food, this view has been generally rejected by modem courts, 3 but has
hung on in the blood area. Thus in Cushing v. Rodman,' 4 for instance, a restau-
rant was held liable for a pebble found in a roll served to the plaintiff, who chipped
a tooth on it. The court noted, "[W]e think it unnecessary to rest the choice
[whether a warranty should be implied] on the answer to the somewhat narrow
question whether or not there can be said to be, in the technical sense, a sale of
food." The court also went on to say, citing Williston:15
Even though the transaction is not a sale, every argument for imply-
ing a warranty in the sale of food is applicable with even greater force to
the serving of food to a guest or customer at an inn or restaurant. The basis
4 Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954); Gile v. Ken-
newick Public Hospital District, 296 P.2d 662 (Wash. 1956); see also Hidy v. State, 137
N.Y.S.2d 334, 143 N.E.2d 528 (Ct. Claims 1957). For a discussion of blood transfusion cases
generally, see 59 A.L.R.2d 770 (1956).
5 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
6 Id. at 793.
7 N.Y. PERS. PRop. LAw § 96.
8 123 N.E.2d 792, 794-97 (1954).
9 Id. at 797.
10 69 HARv. L. REV. 391 (1955) ; 29 ST. JOHN's L. R.v. 305 (1955); 103 U. PA. L. REV.
833 (1955).
11 Golez v. J. K. and Suzy L. Wadley Research Institute and Blood Bank, 50 S.W.2d 573
(Tex. 1961); see also cases cited note 4 supra.
12 See 1 WILLISTON, SALES 639 (1948).
13 ANNO. 7 A.L.R.2d 1027 (1949), contains a complete discussion.
14 82 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
15 1 WILLISTON, SALES 486 (2d ed. 1924).
RECENT DECISIONS
of implied warranty is justifiable reliance on the judgment or skill of the
warrantor...
Briefly, necessity for the protection of that portion of the public con-
cerned and the imposition of an effective -incentive to protect the public are
the basis of imposed insurance liability.
6
The liability of one serving food for immediate consumption, on the theory
of implied warranty, has been upheld even where the food is served under cir-
cumstances which make it clear that the food is served as an incidental to a larger
transaction involving the rendition of services.' 7 The cases stress the justifiable
reliance of the patron on the expectation of being served wholesome food.
In commenting on these food cases the court in Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labora-
tories'" (involving defective Salk polio vaccine) stated that it could
conceive of no reason for applying the rule to foodstuffs which does not
equally extend to drugs . . . the fact that the entry is made by injection
rather than ingestion in no way alters the premise that each is for human
consumption, each enters the human system. In fact, the digestive system
has means of rejecting or minimizing the effects of many toxic compounds
taken orally. Such defenses are much less available as against harmful
elements introduced into the system by hypodermic injection.19
(Query: would not the same reasoning apply with equal vigor to blood?)
In the non-food area, the fact that work or services are to be performed in
connection with the transfer of property in goods does not ordinarily negate the
implied warranty. Thus a mechanic who fixes a clutch warrants the parts he
installs;20 a contractor who installs an elevator warrants the parts thereof, where
separately stated on the bill; 21 an air conditioner sold with installment included
is nonetheless warranted.2 2 In the last-mentioned case the court reasoned that even
though a salesman had already convinced the buyer of the air conditioner to pur-
chase it before the installer offered his services, the installer was to supply the
air conditioner and install it. Thus he was held to have warranted the machine.
The court did not know whether he had made a profit on the machine itself.
23
In another recent case, 24 involving the installation of a radiant heating system,
the court noted that the transaction was not even a true sale of the materials
installed, but that a warranty was attached anyway:
Although the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act with respect to implied
warranty (Civ. Code §§ 1734-1736) apply only to sales, similar warranties
may be implied in other contracts not governed by such statutory provisions
when the contracts are of such a nature that the implication is justified.25
The English courts have also dealt with the service-sale problem, and in view
of the close similarity between their sales act and ours, their decisions have been
held entitled to weight in construing the Uniform Act.
28
Implied warranties have been found in England where hair dye was applied
by a beautician, 27 when a bad connecting rod was installed in an auto,28 where
a dentist made bad-fitting dentures, 29 and where defendant inoculated cattle with
16 82 F.2d 864, 868-69 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
17 Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., 39 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1949) (meal served to a paying
guest in a hotel); Barringer v. Ocean Steamship Co., 240 Mass. 405, 134 N.E. 265 (1922)
(food served to a steamship passenger).
18 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960).
19 Id. at 323.
20 Delco Auto Supply Co. v. Tobin, 198 Misc. 601, 100 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
21 Fifteenth Street Investment Co. v. People, 102 Colo. 571, 81 P.2d 764 (1938).
22 Carver v. Denn, 117 Utah 180, 214 P.2d 121 (1950).
23 Ibid.
24 Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 12 Cal. Rptr. 257, 360 P.2d 897 (1961).
25 Id. at 902. See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, comment 2.
26 Ward v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E. 225 (1918). Section
15(1) of the Uniform Sales Act is the same as § 14(1) of the English Sales of Goods Act.
27 Watson v. Buckley, [1940] 1 All E.R. 174 (K.B. 1939).
28 G. H. Myers and Co. v. Brent Cross Service Co., [1934] 1 K.B. 46, 150 L.T.R. (n.s.) 96
(1933).
29 Samuel v. Davis, [1943] 1 K.B. 526.
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bad vaccine.30 In the vaccine case, the court reasoned that if the vaccine had
been sold, the seller would clearly have warranted its quality; thus he ought not
escape liability merely because he administered it as well.3
Thus it will be seen that the blood cases are quite out of line with the gen-
eral trend of authority, which rejects the service-sale dichotomy in the major
area of food warranties, and certainly plays it down in other areas. It is sug-
gested that the findings of "no sale" in the blood cases actually represent a con-
scious or unconscious resolution of policy issues which will be presented later in
detail. Otherwise, the trend of authority is quite inexplicable when viewed in con-
nection with other areas of warranty law.
The instant case, Dibblee, does not seem to depend upon the usual state-
ment that the blood is transferred incidentally to a course of treatment, but rather
on a flat holding that transfusing blood, at least in a hospital, is a service pure
and simple. Thus the court says: "Furnishing blood by a hospital at the specific
request of a patient or his doctor, and for a charge, is a part of a service, not
a sale in any connotational sense of those terms."
32
In reinforcement of its holding the Dibblee court adds some unique analytical
ideas to the lore of implied warranty:
We think of hospitals not as profit-seeking vendors in the market place....
[A hospital] furnishes [blood] at the cost of procuration, preservation, testing
and administration, - for a few pieces of silver. . . .No hospital gives
green trading stamps on the occasion of a blood transfusion . . .or has a
sales or advertising agent, telecasts with commercials, billboard bits of art,
health suggestions, or muscle-building come-ons incident to a "sale."33
The court thus suggests that the hospital is free of liability not because the
blood was furnished incidental to a course of curing (the only reason for denying
the transaction its otherwise clear status of a sale) but because the hospital makes
no profit in providing the blood, but furnishes it merely as an "accommodation. 3 4
It is interesting to note that Perlmutter, on which Dibblee relies heavily, places
great stress on an Illinois tax case in which it was held that eyeglasses "furnished"
by an optometrist were only incidental to the correction of vision.3 5 This argument
would not be available in Utah, where it has been held that a shoe repairer sells
the leather he puts into shoe soles, even though he charges for a total service,
and in spite of the fact that the leather is less than 30% of the price charged and
is not separately stated on the bill.36 In the shoemaker's case it would seem to
be quite clear that the leather is furnished "incidental" to the larger service of
repairing shoes, and that the Perlmutter holding is to that extent weakened, at
least in Utah. However, the Dibblee court takes no note of this problem.
The argument advanced in Dibblee, that the absence of the pecuniary profit
motive negates the existence of a sale would seem to be clearly invalid. The Uni-
form Sales Act defines "sale" in terms of transfer of property for a price, and
does not mention the existence of a profit.2 7 To choose a simple example, a sale
30 Dodd v. Wilson, [1946] 2 All E.R. 691 (K.B.).
31 Id. at 695.
32 364 P.2d at 1087.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid. However, in Yochem v. Gloria Inc., 134 Ohio 427, 17 N.E.2d 731 (1938), a
restaurant was held to have warranted the water it served free with meals.
35 Babcock v. Nudleman, 367 Ill. 626, 12 N.E.2d 635 (1937).
36 Western Leather & Finding Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 87 Utah 227, 48 P.2d 526
(1935).
37 It would appear that the only instance where the lack of a profit motive would be
determinative in warranty cases is the case of charitable immunity. In such instances, the courts
recognize the existence of the warranty, but" deny recovery on the basis of a finding that war-
ranty sounds in tort, and hence is excluded by the immunity. See; e.g., Forrest v. Red Cross
Hospital, 265 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1954) (food served in a hospital); Lovich v. Salvation Army,
81 Ohio App. 317, 75 N.E.2d 459 (1947) (food served in a home for girls). In Utah, how-
ever, there is no charitable immunity, Sessions v. Thomas Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 94
Utah 460, 78 P.2d 645 (1938).
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of an automobile would hardly be less a sale because the owner sold it for less,
than he paid. Thus in Canavan v. City of Mechanicsville,s it was held that the
providing of water for a price by a municipal utility was a sale and, "That the
furnishing was without profit to the corporatiofi is weightless."
3 9
The court in the Dibblee case bases its opinion on a dichotomy between "service"
and "sale" which is rapidly being rejected in most other areas of warranty law.
It also considers the absence of pecuniary profit important in deciding whether a
"sale" exists, contrary to the clear definition in the Uniform Sales Act. It men-
tions the absence of green stamps, billboards and promotional stunts in hospital
administration, factors which have never been given weight in prior decisions and
whose appearance in the court's opinion seem close to frivolous. It would seem
that the opinion is a clear indication of the problems which arise from making
important decisions turn upon the definition of a word whose meaning is funda-
mentally unrelated to the policy issues involved. Making decisions turn on the
meaning of "sale" has produced surprising results: morphine is held to have been
sold upon injection,40 while blood is not;41 a transfer of liquor by a "social, literary
aid musical club" to its members is held a sale,4 2 while a transfer of blood by
a charitable blood bank (for a large and apparently compensatory fee) is not.
43
(It should be noted in passing that where a blood bank is involved, there can
hardly be any argument that the blood was provided incidentally to a service -
there is nothing for it to be incidental to as far as the blood bank is concerned')
Leather transferred in a shoe repair transaction is held to have been sold,"4 while
blood transferred in human repair is but an incidental to a service.4
Of course, "sale" in fact means different things in different contexts. The
morphine case noted above was a criminal prosecution under the narcotics laws;
the liquor case involved a liquor control law; and so on. Nevertheless, when a
patient enters a hospital, it would seem irrelevant as a basis for liability whether
he will be "sold" blood or not. In any case he pays for - and expects to get -
blood that will not kill him.
Decisions in this area must grapple with and answer such issues and argu-
ments as the difficulty of proving a hospital negligent in handling blood; the
existence of charitable immunity in the jurisdiction; the justice of imposing .the
total loss from a blood mistake upon the patient, which in effect forces him to
make an exceedingly large charitable donation -against his will; the availability
of cheap liability insurance; whether strict liability will promote the finding of
safer methods; and finally, whether a patient who is entirely and completely at
the mercy of the technical competence of a hospital ought to have the right to
rely on the quality of blood injected into him. The patron of a restaurant has at
least the possibility of smelling bad food or seeing the rock in his pie before he
eats it; yet he is protected. The hospital patient does not have this -advantage.
California has resolved these issues by statute, and simply provides -that no
warranty will attach to any blood transfusion.46 This approach has the merit of
recognizing that the problems with blood transfusions are simply different from
38 229 N.Y. 473, 128 N.E. 882 (1920).
39 Id. at 883. See also Yochem v. Gloria Inc., 134 Ohio 427, 17 N.E.2d 731 (1938) (water
served in restaurant).
40 Ratigan v. United States, 88 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1937).
41 Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
42 State v. Delaware Saengerbund, 5 Boyce 162, 91 Atl. 290 (Del. 1914).
43 Golez v. J. K. and Suzy L. Wadley Research Institute and Blood Bank, 50 S.W.2d 573
(Tex. 1961).
44 Western Leather and Finding Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 87 Utah 227, 48 P.2d 526
(1935).
45 Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954); Dibblee v.
Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 364 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1961).
46 CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 1623.
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the ordinary warranty situation, and does not add to the confusion of the com-
mon law by depending upon a definition of *',sale."
"Although the same effect - denying recovery under warranty - can be
achieved through defining and redefining the word "sale," such a course of action
creates precedent which complicates future non-blood cases and can also result
in any transfer of blood being deemed a "service" regardless of whether the sup-
plier actually administered the blood as an "incidental," according to the reason-
ing of the original Perlmutter case.
That this latter event will happen is evidenced by the recent Texas case of
Golez v. J. K. and Suzy L. Wadley Research Institute and Blood Bank," in which
it was held, inter alia, that the furnishing of blood by a blood bank (which con-
tributed nothing else to the process of curing) is a service, notwithstanding the
blood bank demanded cash or blood in exchange for its product, acted merely
as a supplier, and had been known to sue for its fees. This is a long way from
Perlmutter. The "sale" or "service" approach may or may not work justice in
the individual case; it will create analytical confusion.
Thomas J. Kelly
SUCCESSION TAX - VALUATION OF STOCK - SIZE OF BLOCK OF SH-AREs HELD
NOT TO AFFECT VALUE. - Testatrix bequeathed 8,100 shares of stock to be held
in trust for the members of her family. The county auditor, for succession tax pur-
poses, valued the stock at $19.75 per share, which was the mean between the bid
and asked price of over-the-counter sales on the date of the decedent's death. The
probate court, in determining the tax, found that the block could not have been
sold in the existing over-the-counter market within a reasonable time (thirty days)
without materially depressing the price. The court was also satisfied that the most
efficient method of disposing of the shares would be through a sale to a brokerage
underwriter at around $18 per share, the broker's commission being estimated at
$1.75 per share. Consequently, the court valued the stock at $18 per share in as-
sessing the tax. The Court of Appeals affirmed the probate court and on appeal the
Ohio Supreme Court held: reversed. For succession tax purposes the value of
shares of stock should be the actual market price at which shares of the same stock
were sold on the date of death, in units in which they are usually sold, regardless
of the size of the block. In re Sears' Estate, 178 N.E.2d 240 (Ohio 1961).
The theory that in some cases a large block of stock should be valued lower
than the existing market price, is not a new one in the field of appraisal for inherit-
ance and gift tax purposes. "Blockage" was adequately explained in Phipps v.
Commissioner,' wherein the court stated:
The reasoning on which this theory of valuation is based is that a large
block of stock cannot ordinarily be marketed and turned into cash as readily
as a few shares; also, that where there is only a limited market for a stock,
offering a large block of the stock depresses the market and lowers the price
that can be obtained for the stock. The conclusion that flows from this
premise is that evidence of sales of small blocks of stock is not a criterion of
the value of a large block of the same stock.
2
Taxpayers see in this theory of valuation a convenient method of reducing
taxes, and make every effort to convince the court that "blockage" should be in-
voked. On the other hand, the tax authorities make equally strong efforts to apply
the unit rule, which is a method of valuing stock whereby the total number of
shares to be valued is multiplied by the sale price of one share sold on a stock
exchange, without regard for other factors affecting value.3 The question of how
47 50 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. 1961).
1 127 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 1942).
2 Phipps v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 214, 216 (10th Cir. 1942).
3 Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Reeves, 259 S.W.2d 432 (Ky. 1953).
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securities should be valued has been at issue in the federal as well as in the state
courts. This discussion will begin with a study of federal cases; an attempt will be
made to trace the history of "blockage," and to show what tests the federal courts
have developed over the years to arrive at the value of large blocks of stock for tax
purposes. Though the instant case was concerned with valuation for inheritance
tax purposes, the survey will also include cases concerning valuation for the imposi-
tion of gift taxes, as the principles involved in both areas are the same.
The proponents of the blockage theory did not get recognition in the federal
courts without a struggle. The early Treasury Regulations specifically provided that
the size of the block of securities to be valued should not be considered in deter-
mining fair market value, and stated that the value should be determined by the
price at which the stock actually sold on the relevant market on the critical date.4
Three federal cases seem to have followed this Regulation, as in each the court
refused to be swayed by testimony that all the shares could not be sold at one time
at the price for which smaller amounts had sold on the stock market on the date of
death. The courts affirmed the value found by checking the stock market quota-
tions.5 In Gamble v. Commissioner,6 the court stated: "The price which the stock,
as a block, would have brought on the basic date was purely speculative. The con-
clusion was based upon an assumed state of facts."
7
However, in 1937, the courts started to break away from the Regulations. In
Jenkins v. Smith," the court held that in valuing corporate stock for estate tax pur-
poses, evidence that a large block could not be sold at the same price as small blocks
on the date of decedent's death, should be considered in determining fair market
value. The court held as it did even in the face of an objection that the taxpayer
had not disposed of the shares. It said that to determine fair market value as of the
critical date, an estimation of what the stock would have sold for was necessary,
because fair market value as of a given day means the price that actually could have
been realized on that day. In 1938, the same court again refused to be bound by
the regulations and gave recognition to the size of the block, although it stated that
this was only one factor to be considered. 9
Final commitment to the idea that the size of the block to be valued should be
considered, the Regulations notwithstanding, came in 1938.10 In affirming the Board
of Tax Appeals the Fourth Circuit held:
In our opinion, the Board was right in basing its conclusions upon the
realities as it found them rather than upon considerations of abstract logic.
It could not ignore the pregnant fact, having found it to exist, that a large
block of stock cannot be marketed and turned into money as readily as a
few shares. The opposite condition might possibly have prevailed, for the in-
fluence of ownership of a large number of shares upon corporate control
might give them a value in excess of prevailing market quotations; in which
event the application of the administrative rule would be unfair to the gov-
ernment. It would have been improper of course to have adopted as the true
value of the stock the price obtainable by forcing or dumping the whole
block on the market at one time; and likewise improper to have based the
finding on the value as of an earlier or later date. But the Board did none
of these things. It took into consideration the difficulty inherent in disposing
of so large a quantity of stock, the market price for a few hundred shares on
the day of death, and the downward trend of the market as indicated by sales
before and after death, and it made an estimate of market value of the whole,
as required by the statute.""
4 Treas. Reg. 79 § 506 Art. 19-1 (1932); Treas. Reg. 80 § 302 Art. 10 (a) (1936).
5 Gamble v. Commissioner, 101 F.2d 565. (6th Cir. 1939); Richardson v. Helvering, 80
F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Roth v. Wardell, 77 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1935).
6 101 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1939).
7 Id. at 567.
8 21 F. Supp. 251 (D. Conn. 1937).
9 Knoblich v. Smith, 25 F. Supp. 156 (D. Conn. 1938).
10 Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 95 F.2d 806 (4th Cir. 1938).
11 Id. at 812.
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This leading decision was followed by several more cases in which the Regula-
tions were also rejected.' 2
As a result of the courts' refusal to be bound, the "unit rule" provision was
removed from the Regulations in 1939, and for the next nineteen years neither the
statute nor the regulations contained any reference to "blockage."' 3 Apparently by
1942, the doctrine was generally considered to be part of the federal law, because
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals said:
As well as any controverted question of administrative law may'be settled
without declaration by the Supreme Court, it is established that the size of a
block of listed stock may be a factor to be considered in its valuation for gift
or estate tax purposes.14
In the early forties the courts adopted a somewhat different attitude as to what
effect the size of the block of shares should have in determining value. The courts
began to look not at what the block could be sold for on one day, but rather to
the price at which the stock could be sold within a reasonable time after the valua-
tion date by a skilled broker or executor. In Bull v. Smith, 5 the court affirmed the
Commissioner's valuation of a large block of shares at the price the stock sold for
on the stock market on the date of decedent's death, in spite of testimony that if
all the shares had been sold on that day, the market would have been depressed. The
court said:
In a reasonably ready market shares of stock might be worth the price
quoted on a particular date even though no purchaser would have been
available for a large block if in the near future all the shares could have been
"peddled out" according to the practice of prudent executors at the price
realizable on the critical date for a small number of shares.'8
The same test was set out in three other cases.' 7
The next development occurred around 1945 when the courts began to recog-
nize the fact that the normal method of disposing of large blocks of stock is by way
of a secondary distribution. When this method is used, the shares are sold to a
broker or underwriter, who then resells them in such a way as not to depress the
market. Since the broker or underwriter receives a commission on every share he
sells, the fair market value is held to be the market price less the commission. This
method of valuation was sanctioned in at least three cases.'
8
As was stated earlier,' 9 after losing out in the courts, the federal tax officials
dropped the provision that the size of the block to be valued should not be consid-
ered in determining fair market value. From 1939 until 1958 the Regulations were
silent on the subject; but in 1958, the Regulations to the 1954 Code took notice of
"blockage" once again. The Regulations now state:
In certain exceptional cases, the size of the block of stock to be valued in
relation to the number of shares changing hands in sales may be relevant
in determining whether selling prices reflect the fair market value of the
block of stock to be valued. If the executor can show that the block of stock
to be valued is so large in relation to the actual sales on the existing market
that it could not be liquidated in a reasonable time without depressing the
market, the price at which the block could be sold as such outside the usual
market, as through an underwriter, may be a more accurate indication of
value than market quotations.20
12 Page v. Howell, 116 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1940); Commissioner v. Shattuck, 97 F.2d 790
(7th Cir. 1938) ; Helvering v. Kimberly, 97 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1938) ; Dupont v. Deputy, 26 F.
Supp. 773 (D. Del. 1939).
13 1 MERTENS, FEDERAL GIFT & ESTATE TAXATION 504 n. 26 (1959).
14 Helverng v. Maytag, 125 F.2d 55, 63 (8th Cir. 1942).
15 119 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1941).
16 Id. at 491.
17 Richardson v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1945); Mott v. Commissioner, 139
F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1943); Helvering v. Maytag, 125 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1942).
18 Commissioner v. Stewart's Estate, 153 F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 1946); Groff v. Mumford, 150
F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1945); Bartol v. McGinnes, 185 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Penn. 1960).
19 See note 13 supra.
20 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(e) (1961).
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Thus, it would seem that the federal tax authorities have finally acquiesced in the
thinking of the courts.
Generally speaking, the blockage rule has fared much better in federal courts
than it has in the states. Many of the arguments in the state courts involving valua-
tion of stock for inheritance tax purposes, have centered around the interpretation
of the statute which set the standard of value to be determined. It is striking that
the statutes of the various states, though different in form and wording, are usually
all interpreted to call for a value determined by the price to be received from a sale
between a willing seller and a willing buyer. But once having arrived at relatively
the same interpretation, the courts have differed in applying it to the facts. A con-
sideration of some state cases and statutes will illustrate this point.
The Ohio statute in the instant case called for the determination of the "actual
market value."21 The court interpreted this value to be the price that could be
obtained in the open market from a sale between one who wants to sell and one
who wants to buy, neither party being forced to do so. It decided further that to
adopt the price for which the shares could be sold, within the declared time of
thirty days after death, would be arbitrary and unrealistic. A sale of this kind, rea-
soned the court, would be a forced sale and not a sale that the seller was willing to
make, and, therefore, not a proper test of the actual market value as defined by
the statute and interpreted by the court.
22
The Minnesota court " interpreted a statute2 4 which called for the determina-
tion of "full and true value," in terms of the price to be obtained from a sale which
was made willingly, and which was not a forced or auction sale. The court held
that to determine the "full and true value" as the price which could be received
from a sale of all the stock on one day or from a wholesale transaction through a
broker would be contrary to the statute because such a sale would be a forced sale.
In Florida Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. Simpson 2 5 the court was concerned with
the "full cash value," 26 for intangibles tax purposes. Although the majority decided
the case on other grounds, without defining "full cash value," one of the dissenting
judges felt that this standard of value meant the amount of cash that could have
been received if the property was sold and, therefore, the taxpayer should only be
taxed on what the large block of stock would have brought, if he had sold it all on
one day.
Other states have statutes defining the value to be determined in terms of a
willing seller and willing buyer, but their courts have arrived at the opposite result.
In a Kentucky case,27 the court applied a constitutional provision which specified
that for tax purposes property was to be valued at its "fair cash value, estimated
at the price it would bring at a voluntary sale.' 28 Now it would seem that a volun-
tary sale should mean a sale between a willing buyer and seller, but the court
allowed the fact that the block of stock could not have been sold on one day with-
out depressing the market to be taken into account in arriving at "fair cash value."
Another example of how the courts can interpret the statutes which set the
standard of value in the same way and arrive at opposite conclusions, is Calvert v.
Kattar,29 a Texas case. In that case the standard of value was "actual market
value,"2 0 and this value was defined in terms of a willing seller and buyer; still
21 OHxo Rv. Cona § 5731.02 (Anderson 1953).
22 In Re Sears' Estate, 178 N.E.2d 240 (1961).
23 State v. Wagner, 233 Minn. 286, 46 N.W.2d 676 (1951).
24 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 272.03 (1945).
25 59 So.2d 751 (Fla. 1952).
26 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 199.05 (1941).
27 Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Reeves, 259 S.W.2d 432 (Ky. 1953).
28 Id. at 433-34.
29 301 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. 1957).'
30 General Laws of Texas, Acts 1923, 2nd C.S., P63; amended, Acts 1939, 46 Leg. p.646
§ 3.
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the court gave a large block of stock a discounted value because of its size.
It seems appropriate to point out at this time that the federal tax regulations
also define "fair market value" in terms of the willing buyer and seller,31 but few
federal courts have taken this factor into consideration in valuing large blocks of
stock. One of the few courts32 that did consider this factor refused to value the
block of stock at a lower figure because of its size and indicated that it felt that
stock market prices were the best indication of "true market value.1
33
Another point on which the state courts differ is whether "blockage" should
be applied when the taxpayer has no need nor desire to sell the large block of stock.
The Ohio court,3' though it did not decide the case solely on that ground, did men-
tion that blockage should not be applied where none of the stock had been sold
nor would need to be sold for any reason. State v. Wagner,35 also stressed this fact
in refusing application of the blockage rule; and it was precisely because the stock
did not have to be sold that the court in Florida Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. Simp-
son, 6 refused to invoke "blockage."
In a 1936 New Jersey case, 37 the judge made it clear that he was not impressed
with the idea of estimating the results of a fictitious sale, when no sale had been
made:
The argument is unsound. It is undoubtedly true that if the executom
had placed this entire block on the market on the day of decedent's death,
the price would have broken to approximately nothing. But the executors
were not required to sell that block on that day. The statute says nothing
about selling; the statute speaks only of the fair market value on the day of
death.35
Other states, however, have not felt that this issue was controlling or even of
much weight.3 9 For example in Newberry v. Walsh,"0 the court stated: "It is
immaterial, of course, that no sale has taken place. If market value is to be an
index of appraisal we necessarily deal in a hypothetical transaction so far as the
claimant is concerned.1 41 At least one federal case took the same view.4"
It seems safe to say that recognition of "blockage" is firmly imbedded in the
federal courts, especially since the Regulations have been amended. But even though
"blockage" is recognized, it would not be prudent for federal taxpayers to assume
that just because they have a large block of stock, they will get an automatic reduc-
tion in value. As the court said in Maytag v. Commissioner:1
3
[Tlhe fact that a gift involves a large number of shares compared with
the amount of like stock currently sold on the market, standing alone and
without more, does not create a presumption that the fair market value of
the stock constituting the gift is less than the quotations on the market."
On the state level it is impossible to make a general statement of the status of
the blockage rule. Relatively few states have had to consider the issue and there
is no indication of a trend either towards its recognition, or away from it.
It is also worth mentioning that the blockage rule could be a two-edged sword;
that is, "blockage" could be applied in an appropriate case to show that the value
of a large block of shares is actually in excess of the market quotations. The situa-
31 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1961).
32 Union Nat. Bank of Pittsburgh v. Driscoll, 32 F. Supp. 661 (W.D. Penn. 1940).
33 Id. at 662-63.
34 In Re Sears' Estate, 178 N.E.2d 240 (Ohio 1961).
35 '233 Minn. 286, 46 N.W.2d 676 (1951).
36 59 So.2d 751 (Fla. 1952).
37 Spalding v. Martin, I1 N.J. Eq. 603, 183 Atl. 281 (1936).
38 Id. at 285.
39 Calvert v. Kattar, 301 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. 1957); Newberry v. Walsh, 20 N.J. 484,
120 A.2d 242 (1956).
40 20 N.J. 484, 120 A.2d 242 (1956).
41 Id. at 249.
42 Jenkins v. Smith, 21 F. Supp. 251 (D. Conn. 1937).
43 187 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1951).
44 Id. at 966.
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tion could arise where the receipt of a large block of stock would give the recipient
control of the corporation. This possibility was discussed in at least three cases,"5
although in no case was "blockage" applied to raise the value.
The holding in Sears40 is a wise decision and it is to be hoped that more such
rulings will be handed down in the future as the issue of "blockage" arises. It is
unfortunate, for several reasons, that the doctrine ever gained recognition. First%
the rule provides an apparent tax break for large stockholders. Why should the
recipient of a small block of shares pay more tax per share than the recipient of a
large block? In two state cases, this result was thought to be not only unfair, but
also offensive to the constitution.47
Second, it is illogical to apply "blockage" in cases where the taxpayer has no
need, desire, nor intention of selling his stock. There is no need to invent a hypo-
thetical forced sale where there will be no real one.
Third, in practically every case, invocation of the rule defies the statute which
sets the standard of value to be determined. The statutes presume a sale between a
willing buyer and seller, but when the courts apply "blockage," they assume a seller
forced to sell and a very willing buyer, at his price. In other words, the courts
have speculated as to the price to be obtained in a buyer's market.
There are, however, two situations when determining value by the price the
stock sold for on the date of death could work a hardship on the taxpayer, The
first of these is in a case where stock in fact must be disposed of in a forced sale, as
where it has to be sold to raise money-to administer the estate or pay taxes, and the
price received is less than the appraised value. A provision in the law like that in
Minnesota48 is the solution; there, the taxpayer can deduct this loss from his in-
heritance tax payment. The other situation where market price on date of death
may not be a fair valuation, could be where prices took a sharp drop immediately
after the date of death. At present there is a provision in the federal estate tax
which will safeguard the estate from this unfortunate event. The executor now has
the option, in the case of property not disposed of within one year, between valuing
the shares as of the date of decedent's death or one year thereafter.49 If these pro-
visions were widely adopted, there would seem to be no good reason for retaining
the blockage rule.
Louis P. Pfeiler
TORTS - NEWSPAPERS - PUBLISHERS OF A NEWSPAPER UNDER No OBLIGA-
TION TO ACCEPT ADVERTISING. - Defendant, the owner and publisher of the only
three newspapers with a general circulation in the Worcester, Massachusetts, area,
refused to accept for publication advertising tendered by the corporate plaintiff, who
was engaged in buying and selling real estate in the same area. Plaintiffs, contend-
ing that such advertising was an absolute necessity to the carrying on of their
business, brought an action in tort. The Superior Court sustained defendant's demur-
rer. On appeal, held: affirmed. A publisher of a newspaper who enjoys a virtual
monopoly in a given area may refuse to accept an advertisement if he sees fit to do
so, J. J. Gordon, Inc. v. Worcester Telegram Publishing Co., 177 N.E.2d 586 (Mass.
1961).
Plaintiff's action was predicated on an allegation that a newspaper was a "public
45 Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 95 F.2d 806 (4th Cir. 1938);
Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Reeves, 259 S.W.2d 432 (Ky. 1953); State v. Wagner,
233 Minn. 286, 46 N.W.2d 676 (1951).
46 178 N.E.2d 240 (Ohio 1961).
47 In Re Sears' Estate, 178 N.E.2d 240 (Ohio 1961); State v. Wagner, 233 Minn. 286, 46
N.W.2d 676 (1951).
48 State v. Wagner, 233 Minn 286, 46 N.W.2d 676 (1951).
49 26 U.S.C. § 2032 (1959).
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utility" thus attempting to bring it under section 763 of the Restatement of Torts
which says:
One who engages.in. a business which carries with it a duty to. serve with-
out discrimination and on proper terms all who request his service and who,
without legal excuse refuses so to serve another is liable to the other for the
harm caused thereby.'
This section is an exception to section 762 which states:
-One who causes intended or unintended harm to another merely by refus-
ing to enter into a business relation with the other, or to continue a business
relation terminable at his will is not liable for that harm.
2
The court in Gordon held the allegation that defendant is a public utility to be a
conclusion of law and not admitted by the demurrer and further stated that a news-
paper was not a public utility. It drew a distinction between a so-called private
enterprise and a business affected with a public interest with the implication that
this latter classification is similar to a public utility in having the effect of limiting
freedom to indiscriminately refuse to contract with the public. The question then
arises: Granting the fact that a newspaper is not a public utility, is it so impressed
with a public use, or does it affect a public interest to such an extent, that justice
would be served only by treating it as similar to a public utility and applying the
limitations on the right to contract incident to that latter classification of business?
In Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations,s the United
States Supreme Court was called on to decide whether an act declaring certain enter-
prises to be affected with a public interest was valid. This problem arose from that
Court's earlier decision in Munn v. Illinois,4 which allowed a broader classification
of these enterprises. In deciding Wolff, the Court formulated three groups of busi-
nesses which assume the characteristics sufficient to clothe them with a public interest.
(1.) Those which are carried on under the authority of a public grant or
privilege.... Such are the railroads, other common carriers, and public
utilities.
(2.) Certain occupations regarded as exceptional.... Such are those of
the keepers of inns, cabs and gristmills.
(3.) Those businesses which though not public at their inception which may
be fairly said to have arisen to be such .... (where) the owner by
devoting his business to the public use, in effect grants the public an
interest in that use.., although the property continues to belong to its
private owner .... 5
Another interpretation of the prerequisites necessary to cause a business to be
affected with a public interest was expressed in the Iowa case of Bowlin v. Lyons.6
Here the court stated:
The persons engaged in these vocations are in some sense servants of the
public, and in conducting their business they exercise a privilege conferred
upon them by the public, and they have secured to them by the law certain
privileges and rights which are not enjoyed by members of the public
generally. 7
In Commonwealth v. Boston Transcript Co., the Massachusetts Supreme Court,
confronted specifically by the prerequisites in Wolff, said that in some circumstances
1 RESTATEMENi, TORTS, § 763 (1939).
2 Id. § 762.
3 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
4 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a
manner to make it of public consequence and affect the community at large.
When therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has
an interest, he in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and
must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the ex-
tent of the interest he has thus created. Id. at 126.
5 262 U.S. at 535.
6 67 Iowa 536, 25 N.W. 766 (1885).
7 Id. at 768.
8 249 Mass. 477, 144 N.E. 400 (1924).
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the publisher of a newspaper may, perhaps, be held to fall within the third class of
business clothed with a public interest but inplied this was only in relation to the
dissemination of news, and where there was an. attempt-by the legislature to force
a publisher to publish findings of a minimum wage board they refused to hold "that
newspapers are "affected with a public interest so .as to stand 'on less favorable
ground ... than the ordinary person."7
9  .
• The court in Gordon admitted that the public has.a strong interest in the opera-
tion of the newspaper publishing business, but as in Boston Transcript, distinguished
between its interest in the dissemination of news and its interest in the paper's func-
tion as a publisher of advertisements.
In any given case, it may be difficult to ascertain just what interest is in-
volved, or to determine whether it deserves protection.... The only interest
the community can have, in any individual merchant advertising without
being discriminated against, is the interest in obtaining knowledge which is
essential to the wise expenditure of money. Generally speaking, the law has
not seen fit to protect such interests as yet.1o
In Mack v. Costello,"- the Supreme Court of South Dakota was presented with
an injury to the plaintiff much greater than that present in Gordon. Defendant,
owner of the only newspaper in the area, refused to publish a legal notice offered by
the plaintiff, thus depriving him of the only means available to retain the legal right
of excluding his land from the corporate limits of the city. The court rejected the
theory that a newspaper is an enterprise affected with a public interest and that the
publisher has special rights or duties conferred on him by his relation to the public,
as required by Bowlin, thus imposing a duty on him to deal indiscriminately with
the public.
The publisher, in publishing a newspaper, assumes no "office, trust, or
station," in a public sense, or enters into any public or contractual relation
with the community at large. It may be said that the publishing of a news-
paper is a quasi-public business; but, if so, it is only because, from long exist-
ence, it is regarded as a public necessity. But as much might be said of the
hardware or grocery business, and yet no one would contend that a grocer
or hardware dealer could be compelled.., to sell his wares if he preferred
to keep them on his shelf.'
2
Almost every case in which the public nature of a newspaper business is at issue
must contend, at the outset, with an early Ohio decision, Uhlman v. Sherman,'
5
wherein it was specifically held that because of the great importance of the news-
paper, the favors extended to it by the law in providing for the publication of
official notices, and the general dependence, interest and concern of the public there-
in, the newspaper has become clothed with a public interest, and that it therefore
must be classed with warehouses, public wharves, inns, and many kindred lines of
business which have been held so clothed.14
A recent New York decision, i s gives an indication of how courts have generally
contended with UhIman. That case involved a situation similar to the instant case.
Plaintiff claimed that the only general newspaper in the Poughkeepsie area refused
to publish his advertisements, causing his business to suffer. The court, in rejecting
9 Id. at 402.
10 80 U. PA. L. REv. 314, 315, n.12 (1931).
11 32 S.D. 511, 143 N.W. 950 (1913).
12 Id. at 951.
13 Uhlman v. Sherman, 22 Ohio N.P.(n.s.) 225, 31 Ohio Dec. 54 (C.P. 1919).
14 Id. at 63.
It is the best advertising medium for local merchants. . . . We therefore
believe that a newspaper company when it has advertising space to sell has
no right to discriminate against a local merchant who in his application for
advertising, complies with the law and the reasonable rules of said newspaper
company.... Ibid.
15 Poughkeepsie Buying Serv. v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, 205 Misc. 982, 131 N.Y.S.2d
515 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
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the rationale of Uhlman,26 noted that the District Court of Michigan, 7 and the
Supreme Court of Louisiana, s have also expressly refused to follow Uhlman, and
that other courts have spoken on the same subject, without citing the case, and have
arrived at a different conclusion.
An example of this latter statement is found in another case quite similar to the
instant case, Shuck v. Carroll Daily Herald.29 The court discussed newspapers from
a historical viewpoint to ascertain whether they were ever clothed with a public
interest at common law.
The rules forbidding the latter [carriers and inns] to discriminate between
customers were established, yet nobody goes so far as to even claim that there
is any holding at common law under which a newspaper was bound by the
same rules.20
The Iowa Court rejected the decision in Uhlman indirectly by holding that the
newspaper business is an ordinary business.
It is a business essentially private in its nature - as private as that of the
baker, grocer, or milkman, all of whom perform a service on which, to a
greater or less extent, the communities depend, but which bears no such rela-
tion to the public as to warrant its inclusion in the category of businesses
charged with the public use.
21
Thus, it is submitted that the court in Gordon was not inconsistent with
authority in its admission that the public has a strong interest in the operation of a
newspaper and its subsequent refusal to grant relief on the ground that a news-
paper is not affected with a public interest. There is a matter of degree separating
the two.
The expression "clothed with a public interest," as applied to a business,
means more than that the public welfare is affected by continuity or by the
price at which a commodity is sold or a service rendered. The circum-
stances which clothe a particular kind of business with a public interest, in
the sense of Munn v. Illinois and the other cases, must be such as to create
a peculiarly close relation between the public and those engaged in it, and
raise implications of an affirmative obligation on their part to be reason-
able in dealing with the public.
22
Having eliminated newspapers from the class of public utilities and from those
enterprises creating such a close relationship with the public as to warrant inclusion
in the class of enterprises "affected with a public interest," the question in Gordon
narrows to one involving the right of an owner of a private enterprise to exercise
freedom of contract, and the circumstances in which this freedom may be limited
by considerations other than the public or quasi-public nature of the enterprise.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court had stated in the Boston Transcript Co.
case that "the right to acquire, possess, and protect property includes the right to
16 "This court has also'reached the conclusion that the rationale of said Ohio decision is
not to be followed in this state in that it is contrary to general and fundamental doctrine laid
down in our decisional law." Id. at 517.
17 In re Louis Wohl, Inc., 50 F.2d 254, 256-57 (E.D. Mich. 1931):
Coming to the specific application of the doctrine invoked, the only case
specifically holding a newspaper to be clothed with a public interest is the
decision of the nisi prius court of Ohio in the case of Uhlman v. Sherman.
It is interesting to note that there the nisi prius judge frankly admitted that
learned and diligent counsel on both sides were unable to find a parallel
case, and he himself had been unable to find one. * * * I find .. . that
there is no such trend of decision as the trustee urges. A newspaper is not
at the common law a business clothed with a public interest.
18 Friedenberg v. Times Publishing Co., 170 La. 3, 127 So. 345 (1930). The court said:
The weight of authority is that the publishing of a newspaper is a strictly
private enterprise, and the publishers thereof are free to contract and deal
or refuse to contract and deal with whom they please .... There is, how-
ever, one case holding the contrary doctrine, to wit, Uhlman v. Sherman.
But we prefer to follow the weight of authority.
19 215 Iowa 1276, 247 N.W. 813 (1933).
20. Id. at 814.
21 Id. at 815.
22 Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 536 (1923).
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make reasonable.contracts, which shall be under the protection of law. 2 3 The
Bowlin case stated in this regard that the law does not regulate the citizen in the
conduct of his private business. "In all matters of mere private concern he is left
free to deal with whom he pleases, and to make such bargains as he is able to make
with those whom he does deal."24
However, this right to freedom of contract (which necessarily includes freedom
to refuse to contract) is limited and not absolute. The court in Gordon stated that
the right to refuse to accept advertisements is limited to situations where such refusal
is not by one whose business has the necessary close connection with the public, as has
been discussed, and also, where such refusal is not in furtherance of an illegal
monopoly.
Thus, in the Poughkeepsie case, there was an allegation by the plaintiff that
defendant's refusal to accept his advertising was a result of the persuasion and coer-
cion of local merchants in competition with the plaintiff. The court stated that
refusal to maintain trade relations with any individual is an inherent right which
any person may exercise, but that this right is limited to situations where there are
"absent factual allegations connecting them with a duly pleaded fraudulent con-
spiracy or with furthering an unlawful monopoly." 25 Relief was refused on the
ground that the conspiracy was not specifically pleaded.
A review of the cases makes it apparent that the reason stipulated for the
refusal to contract are important in determining whether such refusals are sufficient-
ly inimical to the public interest as to warrant limitation. In Gordon, the plaintiff
alleged that defendant's refusal was without just cause and was motivated by
"malice." However, the court ruled that allegations of this type are not admitted
by a demurrer, and thus, no reason was actually passed on. In other cases, the
refusal springs from a good reason, such as failure to pay a bill owed for previous
advertising.
2
Several cases, among them Mack v. Costello,27 and Lepler v. Palmer,8 hold
that even a refusal resulting from caprice, prejudice, or malice is not sufficiently
adverse to the public welfare to require a limitation of the publisher's right. The
remaining class of cases, where the refusal is grounded on a conspiracy to injure
plaintiff or in furthering an unlawful monopoly, as Gordon points out, presents an
essentially different question. While the general holding is that one engaged in an
entirely private business has the right to exercise his own independent discretion as
to persons with whom he may -deal, where that reason is one of these two, the court
will limit the owner's right to refuse.
29
In Gordon, the Court expressly admitted that the Worcester Publishing Com-
pany enjoyed a virtual monopoly in the area; it follows from this that since the
plaintiff could have no recourse to another newspaper, the existing monopoly pre-
vented him from utilizing a substantial means of communicating with the public, a
23 144 N.E. at 401.
24 25 N.W. at 767.
25 131 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
26 See, e.g., In re Louis Wohl, Inc., 50 F.2d 254 (E.D. Mich. 1931).
27 It is not claimed by the defendant that there was not room in the columns
of her paper for said notice, nor did she give any reason for her refusal to
publish the same, other than the fact that she did not desire to publish it,
and, being the absolute owner and manager of said paper, she was. under no
obligation, legal or otherwise, to publish it. * * * Nor may the court inquire
into the motives of the appellant. Whether she is actuated by malice or con-
nivance, or mere caprice, is wholly immaterial. 143 N.W. at 951.
28 150 Misc. 546, 270 N.Y.S. 440 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
It is the well settled law of this State that the refusal to maintain trade
relations with any individual is an inherent right which every person may
exercise lawfully, for reasons he deems sufficient or for no reasons whatever,
and it is immaterial whether such refusal is based upon reason or is the
result of mere caprice, prejudice, or malice. Id. at 444.
29 See text at note 25 supra.
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necessity called for by the nature of his business. -The question then arises: Is the
Court in Gordon consistent when it states that the presence of a monopoly will
limit contractual freedom in some circumstances and yet will openly condone an
existing monopoly which is in fact injuring a third party?
A monopoly has been defined as "the sole power of dealing in. an article, or
doing a specified thing, either generally or in a specific area."'' 3 The Supreme Court
of Massachusetts in 1950 defined a monopoly as:
A combination, organization or entity so extensive and unified that its
tendency is to suppress competition, to acquire a dominance in market and
to secure the power to control prices to the public harm with respect to any
commodity which people are under a practical compulsion to buy.$'
The Sherman Antitrust Act' 2 was passed to prevent the formation of this type of
arrangement involving an interference with interstate trade, and the states them-
selves have passed statutes for the purpose of preventing the suppression of trade
within a state."3 It is the policy of these federal and state antitrust laws to extend
rather than restrict the common law rules as to monopolies, and to remedy their
inadequacies, for example, by giving a right of action to third persons injured by
a monopoly.' 4 However, monopolies have always been considered odious at common
law and inimical to the public welfare."- Therefore, it follows that a court con-
fronted with a monopoly must take a stand consistent with the common law as
declared in antitrust statutes. In the same spirit as this reasoning, the court in Kay
Dunhill, Inc. v. Dunhill Fabrics, Inc.,'8 stated that "it is the duty of the courts to
avoid sustaining a monopoly unless it be demanded by law."
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,3' is helpful in delineating the type of
monopoly present in Gordon. In that case, defendant newspaper publisher enjoyed
30 Tooke & Reynolds v. Bastrop Ice & Storage Co., 172 La. 781, 135 So. 239 (1931).
The court said further:
It is considered that a monopoly exists whenever all or so nearly all of an
article of trade or commerce within a community or district is brought
within the hands of one man or set of men as practically to bring the
handling or production of the commodity or thing within such single con-
trol, to the exclusion of competition or free traffic therein. Ibid. (Emphasis
by the court.)
31 Commonwealth v. McHugh, 326 Mass. 249, 93 N.E.2d 751, 759 (1950).
32 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1.
Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person, or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States ... shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor.... Id. at § 2.
33 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93, § 1 (1954).
34 Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 56 F. Supp. 569 (D. Minn. 1945), aff'd, 148
F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
Under the Clayton Act, the right is not confined to persons in privity with
the wrongdoer, but is given to anyone who has suffered injury to his business
or property by reason of the wrongful acts. Under this law a civil action
may be maintained for "threefold the damages by him sustained." Id. at 582.
35 See, e.g., Schwab v. Moving Picture Mach. Operators Alliance, 165 Or. 602, 109 P.2d
600 (1941).
Monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade are generally de-
nounced as odious, intolerable, and contrary to public policy and common
right. They are regarded as repugnant to the spirit of our government and
institutions, and are frequently forbidden by constitutional as well as statu-
tory enactment. Indeed, as the term is generally employed, injury to the
public is implied from its use. Monopoly is said to be destructive of indi-
vidual rights, and of that free competition which is the life of business, and
it revives and perpetuates one of the great evils which it was the object of
the framers of our form of government to eradicate and prevent. It is alike
destructive to both individual enterprise and individual prosperity, whether
conferred on corporations or individuals, and therefore public policy is, and
ought to be, as well as public sentiment, against it. Id. at 607.
36 44 F. Supp. 922, 936 (S.D. N.Y. 1942).
37 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
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a substantial monopoly of the mass dissemination of local and .national news (in-
cluding advertising) in the area, with a 99% coverage of the community's families.
After the establishment of a competing radio station, the publisher refused to accept
local advertisements from those who advertised over the radio station. The Supreme
Court held that the publisher was engaged in an attempt to monopolize interstate
commerce in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and was properly
enjoined from continuing the attempt. The Court stated:
The publisher claims a right as a private business concern to select its
customers and to refuse to accept advertisements from whomever it pleases.
... The right claimed by the publisher is neither absolute nor exempt from
regulation. Its exercise as a purposeful means of monopolizing interstate
commerce is prohibited by the Sherman Act.38
Lorain Journal differs in two respects from Gordon in that the injury com-
plained of was not to a third person but to a competitor, and in addition, the
Sherman Antitrust Act applied. However, the fact that an interference is with
intrastate trade, excluding the application of the Sherman Act, should 'make no
difference in the result. Since state antitrust laws have been extended to cover
injuries to third parties, it appears that the decision in Gordon is contrary to the
purpose of the antitrust statutes as expressed in Lorain Journal, and in Kors, Inc.
v. Broadway-Hale Stores,3 9 where the court stated that the aim of this legislation is
"to protect the public from harm which follows from concerted or monopolistic
conduct designedto acquire control of a market, usually competitive, to which the
public must ultimately resort....
The court in Gordon, by its failure to concern itself with the presence of a
monopoly enjoyed by the defendant, was in essence condoning- its existence. It
"failed to protect the public from harm" and while this neglect may not be sufficient
to demand reversal, its effect is to promote the evil effects of monopolies in the field
of communications, which, as is said in Mansfield Journal Co. v. Fed. Communica-
tions Comm., 41 are "contrary to the public interest even if not in terms proscribed
by antitrust laws."
Hurley D. Smith
38 Id. at 155.
39 255 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1958).
40 Id. at 231.
41 180 F.2d 28, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
